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Abstract
In this paper, we build the rationale of the financial intermediate’s deci-
sion of making loans to potential home buyers over an infinite time horizon.
In the first period ”good” borrowers with stable future income flows receive
loans and buy homes. In later periods, the intermediate securitizes the loans
to raise new capital and makes loans to some of the ”bad” borrowers with
uncertain future income flows. Currently, we simplify the securitization as
a tool to raise capital without cost over time. This unrealistic simplifica-
tion should be improved in later work. The financial intermediate calculates
the expected payoffs in different scenarios under the realizations of uncer-
tainty to decide whether to make loans to a new borrower and whether to
liquidate a house if the owner is short of liquidity in the short run. After
clarifying the sequence of moves of different agents within each period, we
compute the financial intermediate’s decision rule described by a Bellman
equation. Then we simulate borrowers’ income realization and produce a
figure of house price as well as value function over time.
∗Zigan Wang is at the Department of Economics, Columbia University. Youwei Zhu is at the
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. We thank Patrick Bolton, Tri Vi Dang,
Hanming Fang, Brendan O’Flaherty for suggestive comments.
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31 Introduction
Real estate sector has an important position in economy. Houses are not only
a fundamental demand but an investment tool as well. In the past decade, real
estate property has increasingly attracted fund managers’ attention and become
an important part of their portfolios in order to provide diversification and ef-
fective risk management. With its increasing importance, more credit derivatives
based on real estate sector are found in alternative investments. For example,
two of the most popular diversification tools in managers’ portfolio are financial
products related with REIT (Real Estate Investment Trusts) Index and NCREIF
(National Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries) Property Index (NPI).
In the meanwhile, kinds of derivatives from securitization significantly increase the
market liquidity. Examples are mortgage-backed securities (MBSs), related credit
default swaps (CDSs) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) based on house
mortgage. On the one hand they provide investment opportunities for investors;
on the other they reduce the burden of risk-based/regulatory capital that financial
intermediates must undertake under the Basel Accord adopted by the G-10 group,
therefore making those financial institutions able to provide more liquidity and
lead the investors’ capital to fields with higher yields.
House prices have been an essential indicator of the economic trend since years
ago, one phenomenon is that many economic bubbles start with a lending boom.
Not much work related to this finding has been done in literature. Despite of
numerous articles explaining bubbles and economic crisis, most of them focus on
the stock market sector. They employ models with rational agents or irrational
behaviors to give possible explanations.
The recent economic crisis was triggered by sub-prime mortgage crisis begin-
ning from year 2008. In this crisis, the houses have more (harmful) effects and
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4influences than in previous ones because mortgage-based financial products have
firmly connected house prices with other financial indicators. This is an interesting
phenomenon. Traditional beliefs regard real estate properties as an effective tool
of value preservation. In this sense, effects of houses should be counter-cyclical,
and this is why fund managers use them to diversify. However, if real estate-based
products have been linked with others, the house price fall will trigger price fluc-
tuation of other related financial products. And because of the huge amount of
capital in real estate sector, the firmer the link, the greater the influence. This is
what Stiglitz (2010) says ”contagion of crisis”.
This is market participants’ analytical false of market and investment diversifi-
cation. And this time they systematically neglected systematic problems. Historic
experience indeed shows that large-scale defaults never happened simultaneously,
it only is a small probability that mortgage-based securities would suffer market
value reduction by over 10 percent. But those participants did not fully realize
that when market risks are linked together, the value of traditional diversification
vanishes. When house price falls first, interest rate increases and economy steps
into recession, making relative assets more risky and raising the probability of de-
faults - this further causes price falls in real estate sector. The most recent rise
of house price started from around year 2000. Most people believe that reasons
include financial liberalization in late 1990s. Part of the Glass- Steagall Act of
1933, which aims to separate businesses of investment banks, commercial banks
and insurance companies, was repealed as the Financial Services Modernization
Act of 1999, or the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, was passed. Financial intermediates
therefore are allowed to securitize the loans they possess by issuing mortgage-
backed securities, attracting more capital since investors find it less costly (Bolton
and Freixas, 2000). The relaxation of financial institutes’ supply constraints allow
them to lend potential home buyers, triggering a potential rise of property price.
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5Besides above logic, there are other potential reasons of this crisis. Securi-
tization makes the borrowing-lending chain too long therefore causes serious in-
formation asymmetry; inconsistent salary incentive mechanism of managers may
encourage shortism behavior; credit rating agencies are employed by the firms they
rate, causing wrong incentives; incorrect asset pricing models exist, etc. This pa-
per focuses on the initial house price increase triggered by securitization and tries
to endogenize the movement pattern of price increase and crash by analyzing the
interaction between potential home buyers with heterogeneous income structures,
lending decision of financial institutions and investors’ investment on MBS and
other house-based financial products.
In the US housing market, different financial institutions specialize in different
services. A mortgage originator, either a mortgage broker or a mortgage banker,
works with a borrower to complete a mortgage transaction as the original mortgage
lender. Mortgage originators are part of the highly fragmented primary mortgage
market. After the transaction, borrowers pay their mortgage loan payments to a
mortgage servicer, whose duty includes the acceptance and recording of mortgage
payments; calculating variable interest rates on adjustable rate loans; payment
of taxes and insurance from borrower escrow accounts; negotiations of workouts
and modifications of mortgage upon default and conducting or supervising the
foreclosure process when necessary (FDIC Law, Regulations, Related Acts). CDO
and MBS issuers either purchase loans from servicers or issue CDSs to originator
or servicers as credit protectors, then use the assets as collaterals to sell securities.
Market participants also include many other kinds of financial service providers.
In my model, all those financial institutions are simplified into one financial in-
termediate (this is reasonable if all the service providers merge into a conglomerate,
as Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act allows). This intermediate checks the qualifications,
like income structures, of potential home buyers; makes loan lending decisions;
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6collects the mortgage payments; reorganizes the loans and slices the assets into
different securities like MBSs to absorb new capital and lends out again. Also this
intermediate deals with defaults, renegotiation, foreclosure and liquidation.
The financial intermediate considers two effects when it makes lending deci-
sions. On one hand, without pervasive inflation, when house price increases much
faster than income, lenders, usually banks and other financial mortgage service
providers, have to consider the borrowers’ capacity of repaying the debt. On the
other hand, while house price is high and other lenders are lending, lenders may be
more willing to lend because once borrowers are forced to default due to short-term
liquidity shock, lenders can foreclose and liquidate the houses, and if home price
is greater than principal’s value of loans plus interest, the lenders profit. The liq-
uidation and negative income shock push down the price while the lending drives
the price up.
In this paper, we assume the financial intermediate begins with an initial
capital available to lend in the first period. We build the rationale of the financial
intermediate’s decision of making loans to potential home buyers over an infinite
time horizon. In the first period ”good” borrowers with stable future income flows
receive loans and buy homes. In later periods, the intermediate securitizes the
loans to raise new capital and makes loans to some of the ”bad” borrowers with
uncertain future income flows. Currently, we simplify the securitization as a tool
to raise capital without cost over time. This unrealistic simplification should be
improved in later work. The financial intermediate calculates the expected payoffs
in different scenarios under the realizations of uncertainty to decide whether to
make loans to a new borrower and whether to liquidate a house if the owner is
short of liquidity in the short run. After clarifying the sequence of moves of different
agents within each period, we compute the financial intermediate’s decision rule
described by a Bellman equation. Then we simulate borrowers’ income realization
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7and produce a figure of house price as well as value function over time.
The ultimate aim of this paper is to generate an endogenous price evolution
and to produce an endogenous house price curve with first-increase-then-crash
shape. Ideal model includes three parts. The first part is the loan making decision
of the financial intermediate. The decision depends upon potential home buyers’
income flow pattern, current house price and expected house price in the next
period and further future. Here the target of the financial intermediate is to
maximize (expected) profit. The second part is the house purchasing and loan
applying decision of home buyers. The decision also depends upon above factors
and the buyer makes decision to maximize utility. Interaction between the financial
intermediate and the home buyers determines the equilibrium price. The third part
is the investment decision. Investors rely on (lagged) market information to decide
whether to continue purchasing the securities that the financial intermediate issues.
The investors’ decision determines the capital and financial support of house price,
therefore affects the rise and fall of the price. Investors’ information is lagged for
one period, reflecting the fact that information asymmetry and inaccuracy becomes
more serious with longer borrowing-lending chain resulting from securitization.
So far the model only considers the first and second parts. Moreover, the
home buyers’ utility in the second part is extremely simplified. Therefore only the
first part has the dynamic analysis. The buyers’ dynamic decisions have not been
constructed. The behavior of investors is not reflected in the current model.
Furthermore, the model makes some other assumptions like exogenous interest
rates (they should be determined in the equilibrium). Those assumptions should
be relaxed in further work.
This paper is organized as follows. The first section introduces the real estate
and mortgage market. The second section reviews related literature. The third
7
8section sets up the model and clarifies the sequence of moves. The forth gives
computation and simulation of the value function and house price. The last section
summarizes and points out where to improve in the future work.
2 Literature Review
Related literature at least includes two branches. The first branch is the housing
market lending and financing behavior as well as studies of bubbles. Among the
great amount of articles on bubbles, economic crisis and asset pricing, few of them
study housing market1. Most focus on the stock market sector. For example,
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) and Pastor and Veronesi (2003, 2006) studies pos-
sible reasons of stock price increases, the former attributes to different beliefs of
investors while the latter believes that the uncertainty is the cause.
Other researchers focus on life-cycle models and incomplete markets and hous-
ing decisions without aggregate risk. Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2010)
study how life-cycle consumption is influenced by consumer durables in an incom-
plete markets model with production, but limit their focus to equilibria in which
prices, wages and interest rates are constant over time. Kiyotaki, Michaelides, and
Nikolov (2011) study a life-cycle model with housing and non-housing production,
focusing their analysis on the perfect foresight equilibria of an economy without
aggregate risk and an exogenous interest rate. Iacoviello and Pavan (2009) com-
bine aggregate risk, production, and incomplete markets. They study the role of
housing and debt for the volatility of the aggregate economy in a model with a
single production and single saving technology.
1For example, Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2007) and Gomes and Michaelides (2008)
model the production side of the economy but focus on single-sector economies without real
estate sector.
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9Some researchers study the land market. Kiyotaki and Moore (1995) exam-
ine how the amplification and persistence of a negative temporary shock affects
the land market. Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005) employ a two-sector ex-
change economy model to study the empirical relationships among housing col-
lateral, consumption insurance and risk premia. Bolton and Freixas (2000) build
model to compare the costs of different financing methods. Their paper says that
with asymmetric information, different financing tools incur different costs, banks
choose tools under given conditions. Among the financing channels, internal secu-
ritization has a low cost.
One of the most recent and important work is Favilukis, Ludvigson and Van
Nieuwerburgh (2010). Their model’s main implications are: 1) house prices relative
to measures of fundamental value are volatile; 2) a financial market liberalization
drives price-rent ratios up because it drives risk premia down; 3) foreign purchases
of U.S. bonds play a central role in lower interest rates but a small role in housing
booms; 4) financial market liberalization plus foreign capital leads to a shift in the
composition of wealth towards housing.
The second branch is dynamic discrete-choice models, which enlightens me to
model the financial intermediate’s decision choice. One of the classic papers is
Rust (1987) which studies how a manager of bus depot makes decision to replace
engines. As milage goes up because of long-time use of engines, the maintenance
cost is higher if not replacing; replacing incurs a large fixed cost but clear the milage
to zero. The manager must compare the tradeoff to make engine replacement
decision. Rust constructed a dynamic forward-looking model to examine above
what cutoff value the manager will replace.
9
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3 Model
3.1 Notations
In this model, there are infinite periods: t = 0, 1, 2. There is an economy consisting
of N groups. N is very large so each group can be considered as competing with
others competitively. In each group there are three kinds of agents: a financial
intermediate F , a ”good buyer” G and ”bad buyers” B. The financial intermediate
lives in every period. The good buyer G was born in the first period at t = 0.
At the beginning of every period from t = 1 to infinity, a single bad buyer B was
born. So at t = T , there have been in total T − 1 bad buyers born because in the
first period it was the good buyer born.
In the first period, G was born with an endowment of I0G0 which is positive. At
t = 1, 2, 3, G receives I0Gt in each period. 0 indicates that G was born at t = 0, the
subscript Gt means that it is G’s income at time t. The good buyer G is ”good”
because her income in each period is certain and positive: I0Gt = IG > 0, ∀t ≥ 0.
In each period of t = 1, 2, ..., B was born with uncertain income. For a B born
at t = t1, his endowment is I
t1
Bt1
, the superscript t1 indicates that this B was born
at time t1, the subscript says it is the income at t = t1. At t2 ≥ t1 + 1, G receives
I t1Bt2 , meaning that it is the income at t = t2 of B who was born at t = t1. B’s
income is uncertain. In each period, I t1Bt2 equals IB > 0 with probability pB and
zero with probability 1−pB. The realization of income across time is independent.
Both good buyer and bad buyers want to buy houses which give them util-
ity. Below some price, they are better off from buying and holding the houses
than holding an equivalent amount of cash. However, neither one’s endowment is
enough to afford a house even when house price is low, which is an assumption.
Mathematically, I tit < Ht, where Ht is the house price at time t. Therefore the
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buyers need to borrow money from the financial intermediate F .
We assume here that if a B’s endowment is zero, I tBt = 0, F decides not to
lend. Only when I tit > 0 (i = G,B) the financial intermediate is willing to make
initial loans Lti(t+1) = (1 + rit)(Ht − I tit) to i. The subscript of L, i(t + 1), means
it is the amount i has to repay at t+ 1. Since G’s income is positive and certain,
F lends L0G1 to G for sure at t = 0. There is an interest rate 1 + rit at time t for
person i (G’s and B’s rates are different, B’s is greater).
3.2 Loans, Liquidation and House Price
The process of roll-over of loans is as follows. For buyer who was born at t1, if
I t1it1 > 0 , F lends L
t1
i(t1+1)
= (1 + rit1)(Ht1 − I t1it1) to i. At the beginning of time
t1 + 1, the borrower first repays his debt, wholly or partially, with his realized
income at t1+1, I
t1
i(t1+1)
. If I t1i(t1+1) ≥ Lt1i(t1+1), the borrower will have no obligation
from the next period. Otherwise, if I t1i(t1+1) < L
t1
i(t1+1)
, the borrower still has to
repay in the next period and the amount is (1 + ri(t1+1))(L
t1
i(t1+1)
− I t1i(t1+1)). There
is an interest rate ri(t1+1) at time t1+1 for person i (G’s and B’s rates are different,
B’s is greater). Therefore, at time t1 + 2, the loan that i has to repay equals
Lt1i(t1+2) = max[(1 + ri(t1+1))(L
t1
i(t1+1)
− I t1i(t1+1)), 0]
Similarly, at time t2, the borrower i born at t1 has loan with the amount of
Lt1i(t2+1) = max[(1 + rit2)(L
t1
it2 − I t1it2), 0]
Now we consider the financial intermediate F ’s liquidation decision. we as-
sume2 that if a buyer’s realization of income in the current period t is positive,
2We will construct micro foundation of these assumptions via utility of agents in the future
work.
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he must prefer repaying his debt than defaulting. So there is no voluntary default
from the buyers’ side if I t
′
it > 0. We further assume that if a buyer repays at time
t, F has no legal right to liquidate the buyer’s house. But when a bad buyer’s re-
alization of income is zero, I t
′
Bt = 0, F may consider liquidation. After liquidation,
F receives the minimum value of current house price and loans that the buyer
needs to repay, min(Ht− δ, Lt′it). F may not want to liquidate if the house price is
high enough because if F waits to the next period, the loan of next period will be
greater than current loan, Lt
′
i(t+1)|It′it=0 = (1 + rit)L
t′
it. Therefore, a bad buyer with
zero current income faces a liquidation risk.
In this model, the supply of houses follows an exogenous curve3. It may take
the form of step function. The quantity of houses depends on how many buyers
who have received loans from the financial intermediate F , including those who
have repaid all debts and others who are repaying, but not including the people
whose houses have been liquidated by F . The supply curve must ensure a non-
decreasing relationship between quantity and house price.
3.3 Sequence of Moves
Let me clarify the time line of the moves within every period t > 0 now to facilitate
understanding of later dynamic analysis.
(Step 1) Before the realization of income of any buyer born at t′ < t, F makes
a decision rule D(Ht, L
t′
it) to determine whether it should liquidate the borrower’s
house under the condition that the buyer’s realization of income in this period
is zero, I t
′
it = 0. D(Ht, L
t′
it) takes the value of either 0 or 1. D = 1 means F
liquidates. F ’s decision is based on the current house price Ht, which is determined
3We will construct micro foundation for the supply side in the future work, considering housing
suppliers’ utility.
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Figure 1: Sequence of Moves
in equilibrium after all the steps done in the last period t− 1, the expectation of
the future house price at t+1, E(Ht+1) and the amount of loans he has at time t,
Lt
′
it. F does this analysis for every earlier buyer with L
t′
it ≥ 0 who hasn’t finished
repaying all debts. Here we have another assumption that the house price is sticky:
after Ht is generated in the last period at time t− 1, it remains the same for the
entire period t.
(Step 2) For any buyer born at t′ < t, if he hasn’t finished the payment of
mortgage loans, his income is realized. Different buyers’ realization is independent
of each other.
(Step 3) For every buyer’s different realization of income at step (2), F decides
independently whether to liquidate according to its decision rule obtained at step
(1).
(Step 4) A new bad buyer B was born at time t and his endowment income
I tBt is realized, either IB or zero. If I
t
Bt = 0, F decides not to lend. If I
t
Bt = IB, F
considers lending or not based on the current house price and future house price.
(Step 5) F ’s decisions of lending or not for the earlier buyers who were born
at t′ < t and for the new born Bt change the quantity of houses, therefore change
13
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the house price. The newly generated house price will be taken into account by F
in the next period t+ 1.
3.3.1 Step 1
Now we consider at step (1), the decision of F to liquidate the house if agent i’s
realization of income is zero in current period. Given exogenous interest rates,
the value function of agent i born at time t′ in the current period t depends on
the house price at time t, Ht, the expectation of the future house price at t + 1,
E(Ht+1) and the amount of loans he has at time t, L
t′
it. We assume no momentum
expectation of F and F ’s E(Ht+1) is equal to the current house price Ht. Therefore
F ’s value function and decision rule are now determined by two variables.
Since F makes the decision rule at the beginning of each period without the
realization of income, the value function takes the form
V (Ht, L
t′
it) = pB{min(Lt′it, I t′it) + βFE[V (Ht+1, Lt′i(t+1))|It′it=Ii ]}
+(1− pB) max
D(Ht,Lt
′
it)∈{0,1}
max{D(Ht, Lt′it)min(Ht − δ, Lt′it),
(1−D(Ht, Lt′it))βFE[V (Ht+1, Lt′i(t+1))|It′it=0]}
where
Lt
′
i(t+1)|It′it=Ii = (1 + rit)max(L
t′
it − I t
′
it , 0)
and
Lt
′
i(t+1)|It′it=0 = (1 + rit)(L
t′
it − I t
′
it) = (1 + rit)L
t′
it
The first part on the right side considers the situation under which the income
realization is positive. In period t, if the current income I t
′
it it is greater than the
14
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amount of loan the borrower has to pay, F receives full amount of loan, Lt
′
it, and
from the next period that borrower will have no debt obligation. If I t
′
it is smaller
than Lt
′
it, F takes all his income. Hence F ’s revenue in the current period given
positive income realization is the minimum of the two. The second term in the
first part takes the standard Bellman equation format. βF is F ’s discount factor.
The value of the second part on the right side depends on F ’s decision choice
of whether to liquidate when income realization at t is zero. If F liquidates, the
liquidation generates Ht−δ cash where δ is the liquidation cost. If Ht−δ < Lt′it, F
will take all the value from the liquidation; otherwise, F only gets Lt
′
it and the rest
belongs to the borrower. Thus F ’s payoff from liquidation is min(Ht− δ, Lt′it). The
second term in the second part says if F does not liquidate, F gets a discounted
value function in the next period. F compares the values from the two choices and
takes decision to obtain the one with greater value.
Under the assumption of the equality between E(Ht+1) and Ht, the value
function can be simplified as:
V (Ht, L
t′
it) = pB{min(Lt′it, I t′it) + βFE[V (Ht, (1 + rit)max(Lt′it − I t′it , 0))|It′it=Ii ]}
+(1− pB) max
D(Ht,Lt
′
it)∈{0,1}
max{D(Ht, Lt′it)min(Ht − δ, Lt′it),
(1−D(Ht, Lt′it))βFE[V (Ht, (1 + rit)Lt′it)|It′it=0]}
3.3.2 Step 4
Here we also maintain the assumption of the equality between E(Ht+1) and Ht.
When a new born arrives at t with positive endowment I tBt = IB or zero, F makes
lending decision based on the current house price. If F does not lend, its net payoff
is zero; if it lends, the payoff is βFE[V (Ht+1, L
t
i(t+1))]− (Ht − I tit), the discounted
expected value of the next period’s value function net of the amount F lends. F
compares the two values. If the net payoff from lending is positive, then F lends;
15
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others F does not lend. Thus the net payoff F gets from a new born buyer W (Ht)
is
W (Ht) = max
d(Ht)∈{0,1}
{d(Ht)[βFE[V (Ht+1, Lti(t+1))]− (Ht − I tit)], 0}
where
Lti(t+1) = (1 + rit)(Ht − I tit)
d(Ht) = 1 means that F lends.
4 Computation and Simulation Results
The purpose of computation is to find 1) F ’s decision rule under different values
of house prices and loans; and 2) house price path with random assigned income
realization.
4.1 Value Function
Solving decision rules follows standard Bellman equation numerical computation.
We do have some interesting and intuitive findings. One of them is that when
loan-price ratio is high enough, the financial intermediate tends not to liquidate.
Mathematically, an increase of loans increases βFE[V (Ht, (1 + rit)L
t′
it)|It′it=0] but
not min(Ht − δ, Lt′it) since the latter takes a form of minimum. The intuition is
that when amount of loans is high enough (possibly because the loans compound
period by period and rise fast when a buyer’s realized income keeps being zero
for several successive periods), liquidation only gives F a given one time payoff
but not to liquidate gives F right to receive the borrower’s every period’s future
income, probably more than what it can get from liquidation.
16
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Figure 2: Value Function (vertical axis), Loans (horizontal axis) and House Prices
(color)
Figure 2 shows how different values of loans and house price produce V (Ht, L
t′
it).
Value of loans is represented in the horizontal axis and value function is in the ver-
tical axis. There are a couple of curves with different color representing different
house prices. Upper curves represent higher house price. We draw this way to
avoid the complexity of programming 3-dimension figure. The left figure takes
parameters pB = .5, βF = .9, rit = r = .2 and δ = .5. It shows that when loans in-
crease to a high level, the value function stops increasing as the curve becomes flat.
Intuitively, for a common lender, owing one billion dollars and owing one trillion
dollars to a bank give the bank no different decisions because the amount he owes
is too large. The right figure takes parameters pB = .5, βF = .99, rit = r = .28
and δ = .5. In this figure the curves with different house prices collapses into a
single curve since the interest rate is ”too” high.
A 3-D figure is shown in Figure 3. It presents that the value function increases
with house price and amount of loans, more vividly characterizing the points in
Figure 2.
17
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Figure 3: Value Function (V), Loans (L) and House Prices (H)
4.2 House Price
Figure 4 and 5 show the simulated path of house price (vertical axis) over time
(horizontal axis) under different parameter settings. Price going down means the
number of houses liquidated is greater than additional new lending in the period
(the first ten periods in Figure 4 Right and the second ten periods in Figure 5
Right). It is possible (though rare in the current parameter setting) that prices
keep staying at a low level (red line in Figure 4 Left). But more cases show the
increasing pattern of prices, fast or slow, with fluctuations in some periods. Some
paths increase linearly and some exponentially.
The readers need to realize that there is an implied upper bound of house price.
Ignoring the interest rate, the maximum amount of repayment F receives equals
discounted value of IB over infinite time horizon, which is IB/(1 − βF ). When
house price exceeds this level, F will never lend any more, exerting a downward
pressure to the price. In addition, too low interest rates lower the upper bound.
The intuition is that too low rates make lending unprofitable to F . This is proved
18
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Figure 4: Both: pB = .3, βF = .9, r = .2, δ = .5, IG = IB = 1
Figure 5: Both: pB = .3, βF = .94, r = .8, δ = .5, IG = IB = 1
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in the simulated price path. There are other factors affecting the highest possible
house price.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we construct a dynamic decision process of financial intermediate
based on the information of house price, expectation of income realization and debt
history. The decision rules include whether to renew loans to ”earlier” borrowers
and whether to make loans to new arriving borrowers. The dynamic process is
characterized by a Bellman equation.
We compute the Bellman equation to obtain the decision rules. When loans
are small, the value function increases with the amount of loans and house prices.
When loans increase to a high level, the value function stops increasing as the
curve becomes flat. The simulated house price paths over time generally show an
increasing pattern, some exponentially, some linearly and some even stays at a
certain low level. In the end, we explain the existence of an upper bound of house
price under my current model construction.
There are at least four aspects worthy of further improvement. Firstly, this
paper makes several assumptions (though we think they are reasonable and meet
reality) to characterize the buyers’ borrowing decision; also the supply curve of
housing market is exogenous. Dropping these exogenous assumptions by building
micro foundation to describe and derive the assumed behaviors with utility func-
tions should make the model more convincing. Secondly, exogenous interest rate
may be endogenized via competition of financial intermediates. This change must
complicate the value function and the iteration process, therefore substantially
increase the complexity of analysis and computation. Thirdly, there is only one
20
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kind of sub-prime borrowers (the ”bad” buyers) in this model as their uncertain
income follows an identical distribution. If borrowers are with different income
uncertainty, the model may reflect the reality more. Of course, it is also possible
that the changes might not vary the results significantly, then the changes would
be unnecessary. Last but not least, investors’ decisions should be modeled.
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